Finite State Machine Modelling to Facilitate the Resilience of Infrastructures: Reflections by Engler, Evelin et al.
  
Infrastructures 2020, 5, 24; doi:10.3390/infrastructures5030024 www.mdpi.com/journal/infrastructures 
Review 
Finite State Machine Modelling to Facilitate the 
Resilience of Infrastructures: Reflections 
Evelin Engler 1, Michael Baldauf 2, Frank Sill Torres 3,* and Stephan Brusch 4 
1 Institute of Communications and Navigation, DLR, 17235 Neustrelitz, Germany; Evelin.Engler@dlr.de 
2 Institute of Innovative Ship-Simulation and Maritime Systems (ISSIMS), University of Applied Sciences, 
18119 Warnemünde, Germany; Michael.Baldauf@hs-wismar.de 
3 Institute for the Protection of maritime Infrastructures, DLR, 27572 Bremerhaven, Germany;  
4 Program Coordination Defense and Security Research, DLR, 51147 Köln, Germany; Stephan.Brusch@dlr.de 
* Correspondence: Frank.SillTorres@dlr.de; (+49-471-9241-9910)  
Received: 13 January 2020; Accepted: 27 February 2020; Published: 29 February 2020 
Abstract: The ability of an infrastructure to be resistant against hazards or to accommodate and 
recover from hazard-induced destructions and disturbances is characterized as resilience. Usually, 
infrastructures are engineered socio-technical systems or systems-of-systems. Jackson and Ferris 
consider the use of finite state machine (FSM) modelling as a suitable means to depict and 
investigate the resilience of such engineered systems. This paper discusses the capabilities and 
limitations of the FSM model proposed by Jackson and Ferris and if it should be used for the 
representation and evaluation of the resilience of an infrastructure. The discussion is conducted on 
a more general level. However, special attention is paid to monitoring because, on the one hand, 
monitoring is one of the cornerstones of resilience and, on the other hand, Scott and Ferris define a 
state that is emphasized by an increased level of situational awareness as a result of happened and 
perceived events. Consequently, the question has to be answered of how the models are able to 
reflect the need for routine monitoring of the resilience of infrastructures in order to initiate, if 
necessary, adjustment procedures as an appropriate response to changes in internal and external 
conditions. The results of this theoretical study are a fundamental step towards the practical 
application of the FSM approach for the design of resilient infrastructures. 
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1. Introduction 
The paper provides reflections about the usability of finite state machine (FSM) models for the 
investigation and enhancement of the resilience of infrastructures as proposed in [1,2] by Scott and 
Ferris. In general, there is a great variety of resilience definitions. They differ in perspective, scope, 
and objective, and ultimately result in different approaches to describe, evaluate, and enhance the 
resilience of infrastructure systems [3–14]. The variety of resilience definitions and the large 
application range of resilience developments has already led to a wide spectrum of resilience models. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive resilience model that depicts all aspects 
in their dynamics. Consequently, the following question is justified: To what extent can the FSM 
models proposed in [1,2] meet these challenges? 
1.1. Resilience 
The European Commission considers resilience as the “ability of an individual, a household, a 
community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and 
shocks” [3] and highlights the societal view to resilience. Stresses and shocks are the result of normal 
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as well as unintended developments in relation to technological, socio-technical, socio-economic, as 
well as socio-ecological aspects. Representative examples for stresses result from: Component failures 
by disproportionate wear and tear (technological), operating errors due to overload work (socio-
technical), destructive attacks by cybercrime and economic crime (socio-economical), or extreme 
weather events caused by progressing climatic change (socio-ecological). Shocks may also be 
considered as the human response to accidents and disasters that often occur due to the ineffective 
handling of stress situations by the infrastructure. A more technological view is supported if 
resilience is considered as the “ability of a system to detect and compensate external and internal 
disturbances, malfunction and breakdowns in parts of the system” preferably without loss of 
functionalities and any degradation of their performance [14]. According to the classification of 
resilience concepts by Woods [15], this definition focuses more on the reliable functioning and 
robustness of the system under consideration. A more comprehensive view of resilience considers 
the primary purpose of the system in relation to the current and future behavior of system 
components, environmental impacts, and resulting interactions. This systemic approach is reflected 
by the definition given in [16], where resilience is considered as “the intrinsic ability of a system to 
adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”. Hollnagel elaborated a 
conceptual framework to accentuate the four cornerstones to become a resilient system [10,17]: 
Monitoring to “know what to look for”, anticipating “to know what to expect”, responding “to know 
what to do”, and learning “from what happened”. A resulting challenge is the necessity to transform 
these conceptual requirements, e.g., the capability to perform “sensing-adapting-anticipating-
learning”, into practicable and assessable processes [10]. Consequently, it is of uttermost importance 
to have suitable models at one’s disposal that sufficiently consider all factors involved that may affect 
the resilience of an infrastructure during the design, life cycle, and beyond [1,2,5,10–13,16,18–21]. 
Woods introduced four complementary concepts to classify the variety of resilience views [15]: 
Robustness, rebound, graceful extensibility as the opposite to brittleness, and sustained adaptability. 
In general, all these concepts have to be taken into account to achieve comprehensive maintenance of 
resilience for infrastructures. However, for this purpose, it is important that resilience modelling is 
conditioned to enable a common consideration of the four resilience concepts taking into account the 
specific scope of actions defined by “sensing”, “adapting”, “anticipating”, and “learning” [10,17]. 
This paper analyses to what extent the finite state M=machine (FSM) modelling proposed in [1,2] is 
capable of meeting the requirements for resilience modelling, whereas the discussion focuses mainly 
on “sensing” or “monitoring”, respectively. 
1.2. Finite State Machine Modelling 
For decades, classic engineering disciplines have utilized finite state machine (FSM) models for 
the description of time-variant technical systems [22–25]. An FSM model is specified by a finite 
number of states, all potential transitions between the states, and causes (e.g., events, actions, 
conditions, processes) inducing a transition from one state to another. In general, a state is defined 
by a set of system characteristics, which are described by statements (qualitative) or performance 
parameters (quantitative) and differ in each state. The finite number of states derives from the 
considered variety of sets of system characteristics. Therefore, the transition from one state to another 
represents a change of system characteristics and occurs only if the conditions for a specific transition 
are satisfied. The transition condition itself results from internal or external events, performed 
activities and processes, or other changes, and may be considered as input for the FSM model. 
Meanwhile, a considerable number of FSM model types have been developed to align FSM modelling 
to concrete problems, e.g., actor or transducer FSM approach, synchronous or asynchronous 
modelling, deterministic or non-deterministic finite automaton (DFA, NFA), Moore machine or 
Mealy machine, or a mix or enhancement of them [22–25]. This results in the question of how far FSM 
modelling is able to reflect the diversity of resilience aspects [10,15,17]. 
1.3. Modelling of Resilience 
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In the last decades, a variety of model approaches have been developed in order to meet the 
different requirements of resilience modelling, which results from the intended scope of model 
application and the view on resilience. A brief insight into other model developments should only 
outline the complexity of the subject area. A model comparison in general or with regard to specific 
requirements is not the subject of this work. 
For example, Bayesian networks are identified as suitable models for probabilistic knowledge 
presentation and used for evaluation of the reliability as well as resilience of a variety of systems and 
infrastructures [6–8,26]. The stress–strain model developed in [27] is considered as a generic approach 
to operationalize the four cornerstones of resilience, as outlined in [15] and [16]. A further example is 
the resilience-driven multi-objective restoration model, which serves the optimization between costs 
and the resilience of the system of interdependent infrastructure networks [9]. The authors of [10] 
state that the analysis of an infrastructure’s resilience requires common consideration of outcomes, 
resources, and processes taking into account the interconnections and dependencies between them. 
Consequently, a common consideration of outcomes, resources, and processes is an additional 
requirement for dynamic modelling of the resilience behavior of an infrastructure [10]. 
Jackson and Ferries proposed the use of FSM models for the design of resilient engineered 
systems [1,2]. In general, the advantage of FSM models is its ability to enable the unambiguous 
specification of system states, e.g., in relation to a certain level of operational functionality and 
performance used as an indicator for an infrastructure’s resilience. FSM modelling promotes the 
unambiguous classification of states. In addition, FSM modelling forces the elaboration of causes 
(e.g., decisions, events, changes) that ultimately may result in transitions between the system states. 
The latter also directs the attention to additional resources (e.g., support functions and services), 
machine as well as human made, that may be needed to facilitate and maintain the system’s resilience 
during the life cycle of the system. This covers the functionalities and resources to be prepared for 
any rebound or to reduce the impacts of unavoidable degradations. In this way, the system 
boundaries are extended and the number of resilient-relevant aspects to be considered by the model 
increases. FSM modelling may be considered as a suitable validation tool for the current level of 
resilience or to assess the effectiveness of resilience-relevant measures. A prerequisite for each 
validation is a clear differentiation between the states of the FSM model. For this purpose, the system 
characteristics used as validation criteria have to be defined and scaled to the finite number of states. 
During the assessment, the probability of the occurrence of each state is determined. Therefore, an 
improvement is proven if the probability of states with a higher level of functionality and 
performance is increased. 
2. Analysis of Proposed FSM Modelling 
Jackson and Ferries propose in [1,2] a non-deterministic finite-state machine (FSM) model, 
whose condensed version can be represented via a quintuple (Σ, S, s0, δ, F), where: 
• Σ is the input alphabet, i.e., the set of events that can cause state transitions in the system; 
• S is the set of discrete states the system can assume; 
• s0  S is the initial state of the system; 
• δ means the state transition function δ: S × Σ → S; and 
• F  S is the set of final states (can be empty). 
Table 1 lists the state transition table of the condensed FSM model proposed by Jackson and 
Ferries [1,2]. The model uses “7 possible system states and 31 transitions between states” in order to 
“describe the relationships related to resilience”, i.e., S = {NOS, NOS!, pFDS, d+FS, nFDS, adS, 
tdS}, with s0 = NOS as the initial state of the system. The transitions a to g are transitions discounted 
by the FSM model presented in [1,2]. 
The input alphabet of the model proposed in this work is Σ = {t, m, ?+, ?-, ?p,} where: 
• t means any threat; 
• m means management decisions improving the functionality and performance in the 
current state, finishing the heightened awareness, or inducing a final state; and 
• ?+, ?-, ?p are inputs for transitions discounted by the FSM model in [1,2]. 
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The meaning of each state, as well as the consequences due to the disregarded transitions, will 
be discussed below. 
2.1. States 
Two of the proposed states (NOS and NOS!) are allocated to the nominal operational state of the 
system, in which the system or infrastructure operates in compliance with its specification in relation 
to the conditions, functionality, and performance. Under nominal conditions, a new designed 
infrastructural system should start its operation with the state NOS, i.e., s0 = NOS. The state NOS! is 
specified as the special case, in which the situation awareness has identified one or more impending 
threats, which are attributed to external or internal causes. Generally, situation awareness “focuses 
on awareness as process, on the notion of situation, and on the subject of awareness” [28]. The 
establishment of awareness as a process serves the perception of conditions, changes, and events 
(internal and external) with respect to time and space to gain a deeper and correct insight of the 
meaning and potential impact on the situation and its projection into the future [28–30]. The subject 
of situation awareness is in general the resilience of the infrastructural system and in particular 
resilience-relevant aspects, e.g., threats, decisions, and measures. This implies that monitoring and 
surveying as well as analysis and interpretation have to be considered as additional requirements for 
the design of resilient infrastructures. Certainly, it has to be highlighted that the situation has to be 
assessed not only in times of nominal operation. A correct evaluation of the situation plays an 
important role in making the right decisions, especially in phases of degraded operational 
performance, in order to execute measures of maintenance, repair, and restoration in an effective and 
efficient manner. 
The establishment of situation awareness results in a functional and procedural extension of the 
infrastructural system. The resilience of the extended infrastructure also requires consideration of the 
case, in which a missing assessment or a false interpretation of the threat situation occurs due to 
interrupted or failed monitoring, surveying, analysis, or interpretation. The state NOS! assumes that 
the observed threats are real and relevant for the safe and efficient operation of infrastructure. 
However, whether the “heightened situation awareness” is truly necessary depends on the 
trustworthiness and correct interpretation of the provided picture of the situation. Likewise, the state 
NOS leads one to believe in the absence of any threats, even if the situation picture is either missed 
or distorted. 
The proposed model [1,2] uses three states to describe the different losses of functional and/or 
task-related capacity. The system enters the partially functional disrupted state (pFDS) if either the 
supported functions or human-made tasks are executed with lower performance or one or a subset 
of supported functions and tasks cannot be performed. However, the retained functionality of the 
infrastructure is sufficient to provide any usefulness, e.g., by performing the remaining functions or 
a subset of the tasks. For example, a ferry as an infrastructural component can also transport 
passengers with a non-functioning entertainment system or without activities from the entertainment 
personnel. The damaged but functional state (d+FS) is a state with special significance for safety-critical 
infrastructures and reflects the capability to compensate the total loss of infrastructure’s functionality 
for a certain time by alternative means, e.g., by a redundant layout or back-up solutions. A 
representative example is the use of axillary power in times of an interrupted power supply to 
continue medical emergency care in hospitals. Another “worst case” scenario is the necessarily 
takeover of tasks by unqualified or unauthorized personnel. The non-functional disrupted state (nFDS) 
illustrates the total loss of functionality due to damage to infrastructure or a total lack of staff. 
Consequently, a management decision becomes necessary either to initiate a partial or full restoration 
of the infrastructure or to decommission the infrastructural component because the end of the life 
cycle has been achieved. 
Table 1. State transition table of the condensed version of the FSM model proposed in [1,2] consisting 
of the state names; the indexes 1–31, which represent the transitions associated with the causing event 
(t for any threats, m for management decisions improving the current functionality and performance, 
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finishing the heightened awareness, or inducing a final state); the transitions a to g together with the 
inputs (?+), (?-) and (?p), which illustrate the transitions discounted by [1,2]. 
  Next state 
  NOS  NOS!  pFDS  d+FS  nFDS  adS  tdS  
C
u
rr
en
t 
S
ta
te
 
NOS  1(m), 3(t) 4(t) 8(t) 19(t) 6(t) 25(m) 26(m) 
NOS!  2(m) a(?p) 29(t)  b(?-) 11(t) 27(m) 28(m) 
pFDS  9(m) 31(m) 10(t),18(m) c(?+) 13(t) 14(m) 15(m) 
d+FS  20(m) d(?+) 22(t) e(?p) 21(t) 23(m) 24(m) 
nFDS  5(m) 30(m) 7(m) f(?+) 12(t),g(?p) 16(m) 17(m) 
adS         
tdS         
The role of situation assessment has not been discussed for any of these three modelled states in 
[1,2]. This includes the pending decision processes nor infrastructure’s control and maintenance. 
However, this gap should be bridged and requires that the creation of situation awareness should be 
also modelled with respect to technological, human, and socio-technical aspects in order to enhance 
the FSM model presented in [1,2]. With an increasing complexity of the considered infrastructure, it 
may be helpful to introduce various levels of performance and functionality in order to illustrate the 
remaining capacity of the infrastructure and the expenditure needed for a complete or partial repair 
and restoration. 
Different losses of functionality implicate the necessity to make decisions. If the specified 
functionality and performance should be reinstated (NOS), suitable repair and restoration measures 
have to be initiated and realized. If not, it may be decided to operate the infrastructure with reduced 
functionality and/or decreased performance in the agreed diminished state (adS). From this point in 
time, the infrastructure has to be considered as a “new” infrastructure, with altered specifications of 
functionality and performance. Consequently, this state is part of the set of final states F. The subtle 
distinction of the partially functional disrupted state (pFDS) as well as damaged but functional state (d+FS) 
is part of management’s decision to spend no time and money on any repair or restoration measures. 
Alternatively, it may be decided to remove the infrastructure from service. Then, the infrastructure 
is set into the totally decommissioned state (tdS), which may correspond with the definitive end of its 
life cycle, and thus, is also part of the set of final states F. 
2.2. Transitions 
The FSM model [1,2] specifies 31 event-triggered transitions between the states (see Table 1). 
Events, which decrease the functionality and performance of the infrastructure, include disturbances, 
damages, and breakdowns. Events, which may recover or increase the functionality and 
performance, are successfully performed as maintenance, repair, modernization, and restauration 
measures, whereby management decisions are a prerequisite for their implementation. Only 26 of the 
specified transitions correspond to a change of state, while the remaining 5 result in an unchanged 
state. In principle, an FSM model with 7 states should have at least 49 transitions, if the unchanging 
states are also taken into account. The proposed model has five functional and two final states. 
Therefore, a complete specification is achieved if at least 25 transitions between the functional states 
and 10 transitions between the functional and final states have been specified. Thus, good grounds 
exist to discuss the transitions proposed or excluded by the proposed FSM model (see Table 1). 
As expected, the transition from a final to a functional state may be considered to be impossible 
in the case that recommissioning after a longer decommissioning phase is considered improbable or 
unfeasible. It is also quite understandable that threats without a significant influence on 
infrastructure’s current functionality cannot induce a change of state (transitions 1(m), 3(t), 10(t), and 
12(t)). This is also valid for the case that only a partial restoration of functions and tasks has been 
completed (18(m)). It is legitimate to ask for events where a persistence of states (?p, p = persisting) 
may be achieved at other functional, states such as NOS! and d+FS. For example, the occurrence of a 
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second threat with a potential influence on infrastructure’s performance and functionality is a 
plausible reason to remain in the state NOS!. It may also be expedient to maintain the conditions for 
the redundant functionality at state d+FS in order to get the time needed for an efficient and effective 
realization of repair and restoration measures. All transitions proposed in [1,2] are induced by events, 
such as occurred threats or executed management decisions. The destructive impact of an occurred 
threat determines the resulting loss of the infrastructure’s performance and functionalities with 
respect to technological functions, human activities, and socio-technical aspects of the infrastructure. 
A threat has the same disruptive effects on an infrastructure irrespective of whether or not situation 
awareness exists, therefore a transition from NOS! to d+FS (indicated as (?-)) has to be equally as 
possible as the transition from NOS to d+FS. As expected, threats may cause additional losses of 
functionality, e.g., as seen at the transition from pFDS to nFDS (13(t)), d+FS to nFDS (21(t)), or d+FS 
to pFDS (22(t)). 
Transition 4 indicates a special case, where an occurred threat increases the operator awareness 
(NOS to NOS!) without an immediate impact on the infrastructure’s functionality. The monitoring of 
the infrastructure as well as the surveying of possible impacts is an essential prerequisite in order to 
get close to an overall or even holistic awareness of the infrastructure’s situation [16]. Only on this 
basis can a correct decision be made at the right time in relation to the infrastructure’s operation, 
maintenance, repair, restoration, or taking out of service. Thus, it makes sense that the state model 
should also take into account socio-technical processes serving the monitoring and assessment of 
situations and the use of assessment results in order to make normative as well as descriptive 
decisions at all functional states of the infrastructure, if necessary. As illustrated in Table 1, a more or 
less well-functioning infrastructure can be put into a final state of the set F (transitions 14(m), 15(m), 
16(m), 17(m), and 23(m)–28(m)), but these transitions can only be initiated by corresponding 
management decisions. Management decisions also determine whether and when repair measures 
have to performed in order to recover the infrastructure’s functionality and performance partially or 
even fully (transitions 9(m), 31(m), 20(m), 5(m), 30(m), and 7(m)). At this point, it should be noted 
that the transition to a state with higher performance and functionality will only be attained if the 
subjects of management decisions have been implemented and executed. 
In summary, the FSM model proposed in [1,2] excludes transitions, indicated by (?+), with 
increasing functionality (d+FS to NOS!, nFDS to d+FS, and pFDS to d+FS), transitions, indicated by 
(?p) that prepare only the recovery of functionality (persisting of states NOS!, d+FS, and nFDS), and 
transitions, indicated by (?-), due to which the resilient design avoids the immediate loss of 
functionality and performance (NOS! to d+FS). However, an FSM model used for the resilient design 
of infrastructures as a socio-technical system-of-systems has to encourage the developer, the operator, 
as well as the service provider to exploit all means for the infrastructure’s improvement and 
protection. Therefore, the design of resilient infrastructures has to start with the consideration of all 
possible transitions in principle. 
2.3. Unambiguous State Classification 
The resilience of a system or infrastructure is often evaluated in relation to the required 
functionality and performance, taking into account that the internal and external conditions are 
changing. Therefore, it is reasonable that the states of the FSM model [1,2] reflect various levels of 
functionality and performance, which may occur and have to be clearly specified. Functionality is 
sometimes considered to be achieved if all system-made functions and human-completed tasks of the 
infrastructure are successfully performed in compliance with the specifications. Alternatively, 
functionality can stand for the capability of a redundant system to provide services with at least a 
sub-set of successfully performed functions and tasks. The scope of infrastructure modelling, 
function/task-related or service-related, ultimately determines if a loss of a single function, within a 
redundant system, has no influence on the NOS or results in any state of degradation, e.g., pFDS, 
d+FS, or nFDS. Therefore, an important prerequisite for FSM modelling is the unambiguous setting 
of infrastructure boundaries to fix the requirements to be considered. 
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Table 2. States of an extended FSM model specifically focusing on the service provision (using a ferry 
as example). 
State of 
service 
System-made 
functions    
Human-done tasks  Explanation Example 
Nominal 
Operational 
State 
(NOS) 
A set-up of 
successfully 
performed 
functions ensures 
the service 
provision. 
Humans’ activities 
meet resources and 
requirements for 
nominal operation. 
The 
requirements 
on service 
provision are 
met. 
The ferry operates 
on time without 
intolerable risks 
and losses. 
Sufficient 
Operational 
State 
(SOS) 
Performance 
degradation 
occurs at one or 
few functions of 
the used 
functional setup. 
Humans’ activities 
are applied or 
performed in a 
sufficient manner. 
The service is 
provided with 
a tolerable 
degradation of 
performance. 
The ferry 
transportation is 
slightly delayed 
due to insufficient 
consideration of 
transport volume. 
Performance 
Degraded 
State 
(PDS) 
Performance 
degradation 
occurs at one or a 
few functions of 
the used 
functional setup, 
or disturbances 
and break downs 
decrease the 
capability of 
controlling. 
Humans’ activities 
are inadequately 
applied or 
performed. 
The service is 
provided with 
a non-
negligible 
degradation of 
performance. 
The ferry is 
unable to provide 
the planned 
transportation 
service on time 
and volume due 
to rough weather 
conditions. 
Functional 
Degraded 
State 
(FDS) 
Failures and 
breakdowns of 
one or a few 
functions at the 
used functional 
setup results into 
partial service 
provision. 
Humans’ tasks are 
erroneously 
performed, or 
operation-relevant 
responsibilities are 
not perceived. 
The scope of 
services is 
degraded. 
One of the ferry 
ramps cannot be 
operated, the 
transportation of 
trucks is 
impossible. 
Non-
operational 
Disrupted 
State 
(nODS) 
None of the 
supported 
functional setups 
achieves the 
ability of service 
provision. 
Humans’ lost the 
ability to perceive 
the operation-
relevant 
responsibilities. 
The provision 
of services is 
interrupted. 
The staff team of 
the ferry is on 
strike or in 
quarantine. 
Damaged 
but 
Operational 
State* 
(d+OS) 
None of the 
supported 
functional setup is 
able to provide 
the desired service 
(nODS), however, 
the service 
provision is 
continued for a 
certain time. 
Humans’ lost the 
ability to perceive 
the operation-
relevant 
responsibilities 
(nODS), however, 
the service provision 
is continued for a 
certain time. 
The service 
provision is 
temporary 
continued 
using 
alternative 
means.  
The outage of 
ships navigational 
system is 
compensated by 
the support of 
coast guard. 
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Controlled 
Service 
Disruption 
(CSD) 
- - 
Intended 
interruption of 
service 
provision for 
repair or 
maintenance. 
 
 
It also must be decided if the performance has to be considered either as an intrinsic property of 
functionality (e.g., provision of situational data with the required performance) or as an additional 
quality indicator of a performed task (provision of situational data with a certain accuracy and 
actuality). 
If an FSM model is used for the design and operation of resilient infrastructures, a service-related 
holistic modelling approach is preferred. This implies that the related states have to be defined for 
each service supported by the infrastructure taking into account the functionalities needed for the 
service provision. Table 2 proposes the states of such an FSM model. One can note that each of the 
functionalities represented by the model requires a coordinated use of system-made functions and 
human-completed activities. Therefore, the states described in Table 2 have to be applied to single 
functional sub-systems. 
Table 2 does not include the final states introduced in [1,2] that indicate the end of an 
infrastructure’s life cycle or the continued existence as a “new” infrastructure with changed or 
degraded service provision. An FSM model can renounce on the illustration of these states, i.e., F is 
empty, if a return to the listed states of service provision is excluded. However, the sole consideration 
of service provision under the consideration of system-made functions and human-made tasks is an 
insufficient approach to give guidance for the design of resilient infrastructures and as far as possible 
reliable service provision. 
3. Suitability of FSM Modelling to Analyze Infrastructure’s Resilience 
FSM modelling of infrastructures promotes the specification of requirements for service 
provision and, consequently, the specification of the technical and operational requirements and 
conditions for individual components, functions, processes, and their coordinated interaction. This 
confirms the theory of [1,2] that FSM modelling can be used for the design of resilient infrastructures. 
However, if all resilience concepts are taken into account during the design phase, it becomes 
necessary to extend the boundaries of the infrastructure in order to enable the integrated 
consideration of core and accompanying services. These cover the complementary use of proactive 
means as well as reactive means to maintain the resilience of a considered infrastructure [3,4,14,31]. 
Proactive means are needed to detect degradations and changes and to initiate as soon as possible 
defensive and adaptive measures. Reactive means are the resources needed to restore, repair, or 
adjust the infrastructure on the functional or procedural level. 
3.1. Situation Assessment 
Situation assessment serves as much as possible the realistic ascertainment and assessment of 
the current state of the infrastructure based on the determined performance parameters and 
monitored behavioral characteristics of components, system-made functions, human-done activities 
and responsibilities, as well as internal and external conditions and constraints. The monitoring 
applies to all phases that may occur during the life cycle; during nominal robust operation, in times 
of controlled degradation as well as performed rebounding; and if unanticipated perturbations arise 
in comparison to criteria and assumptions of the initial design. 
Comprehensive and realistic situational pictures and the correct sensing and interpretation of 
observations are essential prerequisites to support the adjustment of system functions and human 
activities to alternate conditions and to make the right decisions. Therefore, an FSM model used for 
the design of resilient entities should promote the generation process of current and emerging 
situation pictures being considered at all states of service provision. In addition, situation-related 
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information should be utilized for the control and management of the infrastructure in and outside 
the times of service provision. Consequently, the generation and evaluation of situation pictures has 
to be considered as an additional functionality whose states (available, comprehensive, true) are an 
influencing factor for infrastructure’s resilience behavior. 
This objective requires functions that integrate the monitoring, evaluation, and visualization 
(MEV) of the infrastructure’s behavior at different levels, including the consideration of 
infrastructure-relevant conditions. Therefore, a second FSM model layer becomes necessary in order 
to model the states of situation assessment as an informational service in relation to the expected 
results of supported MEV functions. Principally, the MEV functions may be performed by the 
infrastructure itself or by external services. The results are used either as input for the control of the 
infrastructure or to trigger management decisions. In comparison to [1,2], where heightened 
awareness is considered a special state of nominal operation in times of a detected threat, it is 
important to perform the situation assessment during the whole life cycle of the infrastructure. 
Following [32], situation assessment has to serve both the early detection that “some things (may) go 
wrong” and the identification that “somethings may go better”. In order to functionalize both for 
FSM modelling, the identification of the questions to be answered is required. Table 3 lists the services 
to be assessed and related subjects of assessment in cases where something goes wrong. 
Table 3. Services to be assessed and subject of assessment, if “some things (may) go wrong”. 
Service to be 
assessed 
Subject of Assessment Purpose 
Core Service 
(Operation) 
▪ The usability and 
performance of components 
and sub-systems 
▪ The availability of human 
resources and the effectiveness 
of their activities 
▪ The conditions influencing 
the infrastructure’s capability 
of service provision 
Evaluation of the current capability of 
infrastructure based on indicators 
recording the target-actual deviations in 
relation to specifications and conditions. 
Core Service 
(Controlling) 
▪ The generation of control 
parameters 
▪ The selection of alternative 
usable setups for service 
provision (redundant, backup) 
▪ The adjustment capability 
of the infrastructure to internal 
and external conditions 
▪ The selection of best 
outcomes for service provision 
Evaluation of the current capability of a 
robust infrastructure to adjust its operation 
to current conditions. 
 
Situation 
Assessment  
▪ The completeness and 
quality of needed information 
▪ The closeness to reality of 
provided situation pictures 
Evaluation of the trustworthiness of 
situation pictures  
Decision Making 
▪ The correct interpretation 
of the situation to make the 
right decisions 
▪ The sustainable validity of 
executed operational decisions 
▪ The sustainable validity of 
made management decisions 
Evaluation of correctness and validity of 
situation-based decision making  
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Service to be 
assessed 
Subject of Assessment Purpose 
Operational 
Management of 
Infrastructure 
▪ The feasibility of aimed 
measures like maintenance, 
repair or decommissioning 
▪ The degree of 
implementation of intended 
measures 
▪ The effectiveness of 
implemented measures 
Evaluation of feasibility and 
implementation degree of measures 
maintaining the resilience.  
 
As explained before, the situation assessment has to be performed for all different layers of the 
infrastructure, which are involved either in the service provision or the preservation and protection 
of the resources in their interaction. Therefore, it is equally important to consider changes of all states 
(NOS, SOS, PDS, FDS, nODS, d+OS, and CSD) and also changes with respect to and during intended, 
expected, performed, or occurred transitions. 
Table 4 lists the services to be assessed and related subjects of assessment in cases if some things 
may go better. As illustrated, the establishment and utilization of situational pictures is an essential 
prerequisite to enable effective maintenance of resilience. This insight is not new with respect to the 
importance of monitoring as one of the four cornerstones of resilience [15–17,27,31–33]. Thus, models 
used for the design of resilient infrastructures should consider the infrastructure’s ability to monitor 
and survey. 
As mentioned above, monitoring is responsible for the provision of information necessary for 
the generation and assessment of situational pictures. For this purpose, data has to be gathered, 
exchanged, fused, analyzed, and used. The variety of questions to be answered leads to a broad 
spectrum of situation pictures that differ, for example, in the database, complexity, and data 
preparation. They have in common that only a correct reflection of reality allows the correct 
assessment of the situation. A correct reflection of reality is only achieved if the availability and 
trustworthiness of required information can be ensured on the functional and operational level. 
Consequently, FSM modelling of resilient infrastructures must not only be able to elaborate the role 
of MEV functions and activities for monitoring, control, and management but should also consider 
how malfunctions as well as bad and outdated decisions can be detected and compensated. 
Table 4. Services to be assessed and subject of assessment, if “some things (may) go better”. 
Service to be 
assessed 
Subject of Assessment Purpose 
Core Service 
(Operation and 
(Controlling) 
▪ The future use of improved 
components and systems, which become 
available by the technological progress  
▪ A more effective adjustment of the 
infrastructure’s operation (functions and 
human activities) to current and changing 
conditions (use of practice-proven models, 
tracing and tracking of models and 
controlling).  
▪ A better coordination of human 
activities due to the use of common 
situation pictures 
▪ The adaptability of the infrastructure’s 
operation to diversity of internal and 
variety of external conditions 
The identification of possibilities 
and opportunities to decrease 
the vulnerability, to increase the 
performance, to reduce 
environmental impact or to be 
adaptable. 
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Service to be 
assessed 
Subject of Assessment Purpose 
▪ The adjustment of the infrastructure’s 
controlling to changing targets (achieve as 
much as possible) 
▪ Continuously training and 
qualification of staff (lesson learnt, best 
practice experience exchanges) for effective 
working under variable conditions 
Situation 
Assessment 
▪ Availability and quality of database 
(integrity) 
▪ Performed quality assessment 
(function and procedures) 
▪ Relevance and significance of derived 
observations 
▪ Trustworthiness and completeness of 
generated situation pictures 
▪ Residual scope of interpretation and 
correctness of situation evaluation 
The identification of possibilities 
and opportunities for the 
enhancement of situation 
assessment of infrastructures. 
Decision Making 
▪ The capability to make the right 
decisions at the right time  
▪ The ongoing validity of decisions (re-
decision or re-adjustment, if necessary) 
▪ the utilization of gain of knowledge 
The identification of possibilities 
and opportunities for improved 
decision making. 
Management of 
Infrastructure 
during its 
Lifetime 
▪ The improvement of the demand-
controlled and situation-related information 
and communication culture and 
management 
▪ The advanced utilization of monitoring 
and surveying results for an adaptive 
maintenance of the infrastructure taking 
into account the current wear and tear as 
well as the availability and usability of 
resources 
▪ The evaluation of the effectiveness of 
measures (management feedback and 
conditioning) 
The identification of possibilities 
and opportunities to increase 
efficiency and effectivity of 
infrastructure operation and 
utilization during its lifetime   
3.2. Event-Based Versus Time-Controlled State Modelling 
The state machine model introduced in [1,2] considers a state transition as the system response 
to an occurred event. Effectively, two types of events are discussed: a) Threats that sooner or later 
result into a loss of functionality and performance, and b) decisions that either change directly the 
state of infrastructure (switching-off of parts, interruption of service provision, or decommissioning) 
or initiate an implementation of measures, whose successful realization will result in a state 
transition. A purely event-driven state machine model is unable to consider and optimize the factor 
time in the development and operation of resilient infrastructures. However, time plays an important 
role for the safeguarding of the infrastructure’s functionality and performance as well as for the four 
cornerstones of resilience. For example, early recognition of an emerging bottleneck in relation to the 
point of no return requires a sophisticated monitoring approach to get the time needed to fend or 
counterbalance the causes, degradations, as well as consequences. 
The monitoring of the situation has to be a routine function/task to be performed in all states as 
well as in relation to transitions that take place. For this purpose, the acquisition, processing, and 
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exchange of data have to be coordinated and temporally synchronized. Situational pictures (as a 
snapshot as well as recorded changes) have to be up to date and close to reality. Sophisticated 
assessment methods have to be used in order to interpret the current situation and to make the right 
decisions at the right moment. This equally applies to the timely initiation of preventive measures 
(e.g., maintenance, operation control, and resource management) and reactive measures (e.g., repair, 
restoration, and damage containment). The effectiveness of measures often depends on its time-
efficient realization and requires the consideration of the factor time. This also allows for verification 
of the sustainability of made decisions in relation to changing conditions and for corrections of these 
decisions, if necessary. 
Thus, it can be concluded that during execution of the FSM model, a synchronous clocking of 
the transitions is required in order to represent the dependencies and interactions between operation, 
monitoring, management, as well as the measures of the infrastructure in their temporal context, 
taking into account time aspects and time constraints. The clocking frequency must be selected such 
that it is compliant with the update rate needed to monitor the internal as well as external changes of 
relevance. Monitoring/surveying and evaluation/assessment have to be performed in time. It is then 
possible to gain the time to initialize and execute preventive measures against emerging threats or to 
prepare and schedule damage containment and recovery measures in a forward-looking efficient and 
effective manner. In conclusion, a state model used for the design of resilient infrastructures should 
be time controlled. This also implies that each state can transition into itself, i.e., the set Σ of transitions 
must be extended accordingly. 
3.3. Infrastructure’s State of Service Provision 
It is important to consider that an infrastructure usually provides more than one service. 
Therefore, it is necessary to differ between the set of states SI representing the abilities of the 
infrastructure as a system-of-system and the set of states SS(k) representing the abilities of the sub-
system providing one of the services (k = 1…K, number of supported services). 
In general, the states of infrastructures are determined by the states of subsystems providing the 
supported services: SI = F{ SS(1), SS(2)…SS(K)}. A set of states, SI as well as SS(k), covers a certain number N 
of states: N = 5, if the model in [1,2] is used, or N = 7, if the extended model of Table 2 is applied. A 
higher number of states enables illustration of the supported levels of functionality and performance 
with a higher resolution. Assuming that the requirements for provision of each service are clearly 
specified and the fulfilment of requirements can be proven (offline rather than online by evaluation 
of the outcome), the current state n (n≤N) of the service-providing sub-system can clearly be 
determined for each time point within its lifecycle (see Figure 1). 
A complex infrastructure, as shown in Figure 1, has the capability of providing more than one 
service, e.g., K = 3 services. In compliance with Table 2, each sub-system takes one of the N = 7 states. 
Therefore, an infrastructure with K = 3 independent services has, principally, up to L = 343 states to 
illustrate the capability of infrastructure’s multi-service provision. This complexity may be reduced 
(L ≤ NK), if either the sub-systems used for service provision are correlated or the variety of states is 
grouped into a lower number of infrastructure states. In both cases, the interdependencies between 
the states of sub-systems and the states of infrastructures have to be clarified. 
An infrastructure is a priori a complex system, because robust and resilient operation of the core 
systems requires monitoring of the infrastructure as well as monitoring of the internal and external 
conditions. The sub-system performing the monitoring and ensuring the access to further 
information has to be modelled as an accompanying service system with its own states. 
Consequently, a multi-layer FSM model approach becomes necessary. 
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Figure 1. Infrastructure’s states of service provision (gray lines indicate the principle bidirectional 
transitions between states, including the remaining in a state corresponding to Table 2) and the 
relation to the states of sub-systems. 
3.4. Multilevel Consideration of Infrastructures 
Infrastructures are socio-technical systems or systems-of-systems that comprise a multitude of 
single resources (components, systems, human), needed functionalities, and activities up to their 
more or less successful coordination on a functional, control, and risk management level within 
service supply chains and beyond. In order to represent such complex systems, one should apply a 
hierarchical view on the current state of the infrastructure, defining global states and related sub-
states. 
Figure 2 illustrates such a hierarchical consideration of states. Here, the system is in the current 
global state FDS of service provision. This implies that the system properties characterized by 
indicators should lay in the value ranges, which are assigned to the state FDS. Within the hexagon, 
each point defines a potential sub-state of the global state FDS with a certain value assignment with 
regard to the value ranges allowed for the global state FDS. Each point has a directional marker to 
depict the changes of the system properties due to external or internal events and influences. 
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Figure 2. Infrastructure’s state setups assigned to state FDS of service provision. 
For the resilient operation of an infrastructure, it is desirable to be aware of the current and 
emerging situation through comprehensive knowledge regarding internal and external conditions, 
changes, and events. Only then, it can be expected that proper management decisions and effective 
implementations of identified measures can be made. 
Hence, further layers of sub-states are added. A green point inside boundary I (narrow dashed 
line) represents sub-state setups of the infrastructure, at which changes that are relevant for 
transitions between global states never occur. From a global view, the infrastructure is in a steady 
state. Beige points in the area between boundary I and II (dashed line) are sub-state setups of the 
infrastructure, where changes that are relevant for global transitions already occur. However, these 
small-scale changes remain undetectable from the global view due to the limited capacity and 
sensitivity of the applied monitoring and surveying. For these setups, there is the opportunity to use 
improved monitoring and forecasting in order to increase the scope of actions for a more efficient 
and effective control and management of the infrastructure. The points between boundary II and the 
FDS state boundary (thick line) indicate the sub-state setups, where a certain transition to the other 
global state is in progress or is initiated (made decision with scheduled measures). A routine re-
evaluation of ongoing changes, decisions, and actions at these points is an additional means to adjust 
the infrastructure’s operation and management at all layers. The blue points in this area (dark 
background) represent the cases where the change is recognized from a global view. The purple 
points in this area (brightened background) represent the cases where undetected threats and 
changes will result, sooner or later, in an unexpected degradation or interruption of the entities’ 
service provision. Due to the existing lack of knowledge (incorrect or delayed situation pictures), it 
is impossible to avoid the emerging transition by a suitable compensation measure and to reduce the 
losses by effective damage containment. 
The example illustrates that the state of change occurs sometime between the start and the end 
time of the transition process. The time period between the start of the transition process (boundary 
I) and an occurred state of change (service state boundary) represents the available time period to 
initiate and perform defensive and protective actions, if the advancing transition has been perceived. 
In general, it can be expected that the longer the time period, the higher the probability of success. 
3.5. Monitoring as Functionality 
As a logical consequence of the previous discussion, the monitoring must be considered as an 
additional functionality of the infrastructure, which the time-controlled FSM modelling must take 
into account. Functions are needed to monitor the system itself (capacity and performance capability) 
and the environment (dependencies and influencing factors), ensuring that infrastructure-relevant 
Infrastructures 2020, 5, 24 15 of 20 
changes become detectable [17]. At this point, the question arises “What requirements have to be met 
by the monitoring?”. First, it has to be specified what has to be monitored. In general, this may be 
properties as well as anomalies or forecasted probabilities of negative events or threats. Second, the 
applied monitoring technique should be able to determine the right identifiers for this purpose. 
Ultimately, the determination and assessment of identifiers should be performed in such a way that 
the achieved reliability and accuracy of the monitoring results enables the required situation-adjusted 
maintenance of resilience. From today’s perspective, it is nearly impossible to predict when 
monitoring becomes necessary. Therefore, the monitoring needs to be conducted routinely. However, 
monitoring is a time-discrete process, irrespective of who (human-made) or what (machine-made) 
realizes the monitoring. It has to be remarked that the right selection of the sampling frequency has 
a decisive influence on the trustworthiness of the monitoring results. Oversampling, which means 
monitoring is performed more frequently than necessary, ties up resources and is cost intensive. 
Undersampling occurs if the sampling theorem is violated [34], e.g., the monitoring frequency is not 
sufficient to detect the occurred change. If undersampling effects remain uncompensated, the 
resulting loss of information impairs the detection of changes of interest. This implicates that the 
functionalization of monitoring requires careful consideration of the time aspects. 
3.6. Functional Integration of Situation-Based Adjustment Processes into Models 
The establishment of situation awareness (monitoring/surveying; evaluation/assessment) and 
situation-based adjustment (controlling and management of infrastructure) has to be considered as 
socio-technical processes, which are important factors for the overall infrastructures’ resilience. 
Therefore, both the production of “situation awareness” and the realization of “situation-based 
adjustment” have to be functionalized and networked with preferably unambiguously specified 
targets. 
• The first target of monitoring is focused on the control of the infrastructure to adjust resources 
and their interactions to current and emerging conditions in order to achieve the required 
operability of the infrastructure in relation to the intended service provision. The control serves 
the efficiency and safety of the infrastructure and is primary a system internal functionality. 
However, for this purpose, access to additional data and information is often needed to enable 
the control parameter to be routinely adjusted to internal and external conditions. 
• The second target of monitoring aims for efficient adjustment and maintenance of the 
infrastructure in relation to diverse changes. For this purpose, the performance of the 
operational service provision, system characteristics, and environmental conditions have to be 
monitored and assessed. The establishment of these situation pictures may be done by the 
infrastructure itself (self-monitoring and self-surveying of infrastructure’s status and relevant 
conditions) or by external services (independent monitoring/surveying of infrastructure and 
providing of additional information to complete the situation pictures). 
• The third target of monitoring serves the surveying of emerging needs and challenges coming 
from social, economic, ecologic, legal, ethic, or other aspects. They create the informational basis 
to analyze critically whether, and if so, to what extent, the service providing system has to be 
modified or even decommissioned, temporally or permanently. 
The results of the complementary monitoring processes are the input needed for decision 
making in relation to infrastructure’s operation, maintenance, modernization, or decommissioning 
as well as to infrastructure’s safety and security. The multi-layer system model shown in Figure 3 
depicts how the functionalities “situation assessment” and “situation-based adjustment” can be 
implemented and networked. 
The lower layer “service generation” represents the functions needed to establish the production 
chain for the provision of an infrastructure’s service and the monitoring chain for the operational 
control of this service provision. As can be seen, if the internal status evaluation of infrastructure 
leads to no complaints, the service provision can be continued. Otherwise, the situation must be 
analyzed (medium layer) in order to be able to implement the right compensatory measures (upper 
layer). In dependence on the applied degree of automatization, each function (shown as a circle in 
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Figure 3) may be performed either by humans (blue circle), technological systems (green circle), or a 
combination of both (blue/green circle). For the sake of generality, each function is depicted in Figure 
3 as a socio-technical function. With growing levels of digitization and automatization, human 
activities will increasingly restrict observation of the fully automated operation of the infrastructure. 
Then, it has to be expected that the layer “service generation” and “situation assessment” will be 
realized exclusively by technical functions. 
The medium layer “situation awareness” represents all additional monitoring and surveying 
functions arranged outside the “service generation system” and completing the “situation 
assessment” of the infrastructure. These monitoring and surveying functions enable the provision of 
accompanying services and can be performed by the infrastructure itself or by external bodies with 
shared responsibilities. As shown, the layer “situation awareness” addresses services for the 
independent monitoring of service generation as well as services monitoring various influencing 
conditions (social, economic, ecologic, legal, ethic, or other aspects). The functions “adjust condition 
monitoring” and “adjust service monitoring” represent the principal capability to adapt the 
monitoring to new challenges and influencing aspects. 
 
Figure 3. Simplified system model functionalizing situation awareness and decisions about situation-
based adjustment processes. 
The high layer “decision making” represents exemplarily a set of functions evaluating and 
assessing the current situation based on evaluated situation pictures (provided by the medium layer) 
and additional information in relation to new needs and challenges coming from social, economic, 
ecologic, legal, ethic, or other aspects. Decision processes are either one or two tiered. The first stage 
(right-hand functions) assesses the need for changes and a second stage (left-hand functions) 
evaluates the options for the implementation of changes. The decision process may result in three 
fundamental decisions: (1) To continue the operation of infrastructure without changes; (2) to adjust 
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the control to new targets and/or conditions; and (3) to initiate a temporary or permanent 
decommissioning. 
Consequently, FSM modelling used for the design of resilient infrastructures requires more than 
one model layer to illustrate and describe the functioning and interaction between the different 
system layers of an infrastructure dealing with service generation, situation awareness, and decision 
making. 
3.7. Discussion 
If FSM modelling is used for the design of resilient infrastructures, the complete process of 
service provision has to be taken into account and needs to be converted into functions regardless of 
whether individual functions and tasks are performed by humans or machines. However, for the 
effective application of FSM modelling, several problems have been identified, which still need to be 
solved in an efficient manner. For the proposed FSM model [1,2], a gap is identified in relation to the 
representation and illustration of monitoring functions as supplementary services for situation 
assessment and situation-based adjustment. This gap has to be closed, e.g., by using multi-layer FSM 
models [35,36]. The same applies to the processes of infrastructure preparedness to manage and 
perform maintenance and recovery activities, to control unavoidable degradations, as well as to avoid 
or limit damages. The consideration of the factor time is essential to elaborate the dependencies and 
interactions between operation, monitoring, and management, as well as to consider and optimize 
measures of the infrastructure in their temporal context, taking into account time aspects and time 
constraints. A time-controlled multi-layer FSM model extends the applicable toolkit for an even 
greater improvement of the infrastructure’s resilience. On the one hand, forecasting as part of 
predictive situation assessment can be taken into account as a prerequisite for hazard prevention and 
damage limitation. On the other hand, additional layers may be used to evaluate the validity and 
effectiveness of decisions and to consider the possibilities for timely corrections. In summary, from 
this research, FSM modelling was found to be a suitable approach for the design of resilient 
infrastructures, if the ability of robust service provision and effective rebounding are addressed. The 
additional consideration of accompanying services extends the infrastructure’s boundaries and may 
increase the functional complexity to be modelled by FSM. This, however, complicates the handling 
of modelling, increases the indeterminacy, and requires an abstraction of functional modelling, which 
is possible in principle. 
Another and rather critical point of FSM modelling is the inflexible specification of states, 
associated setups of characteristics, as well as transition conditions within defined system 
boundaries. This complicates the use of FSM modelling, if resilience also focuses on the sustained 
adaptability of an infrastructure or its ability to avoid brittleness. Due to the runtime changes, an 
infrastructure under consideration becomes an infinite state machine with a potentially uncountable 
number of states and transitions. Alternatively, a suitable way has to be found, enabling the the FSM 
model of the infrastructure to be adapted (e.g., change of external and internal conditions and 
characteristics) and/or extended (e.g., by temporal activating of additional capacities) during its 
lifetime. 
4. Conclusion 
This study identified the potentials and limitations of FSM modelling as proposed in [1,2] in 
relation to the intended applications: Design of resilient infrastructures [1,2,37] as well as evaluation 
and indication of the resilience level currently supported by the infrastructure. The ability of FSM 
modelling to describe technological as well as socio-technical systems in their changeability was 
identified as a clear advantage. For this purpose, the finite number of states has to be defined in order 
to represent the entire range of system characteristics under normal routine as well as under 
disturbed conditions, and after the occurrence of destructive events. The states have to be clearly 
described by qualitative statements and quantitative performance parameters. In general, transitions 
between two states correspond to a change of system characteristics and occur only if the specific 
transition conditions (changes, events) are satisfied. The transition conditions must also be clearly 
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defined, whereby the transition as a process has to be described, e.g., by further FSM models, in order 
to enable the representation of additional functional layers like monitoring. 
The findings of this study are of a theoretical nature, and is a fundamental step in order to pave 
the way in the future for more practical studies that elaborate on how to integrate the FSM approach 
into the design of resilient infrastructures. 
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